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The purpose of this study was to identify the circumstances associated with encounters with adverse weather by
general aviation pilots. Self-report data were analyzed for 224 pilots who completed an internet-based questionnaire,
and who reported their principal residence as North America.  Three groups were identified on the basis of their
weather encounters:  No-Weather, Near-Weather, and In-Weather.  The data provide a description of the
demographic characteristics of the pilots, along with details of the events and conditions that existed prior to and
immediately following their in-flight weather encounters.  Analyses were also conducted comparing the
demographic and other characteristics of the three pilot groups.  The descriptive data were found to be informative
and of potential application in intervention development.  Comparisons of the three groups, however, revealed very
few statistically significant differences.
Introduction
Despite a wide variety of training and regulatory
initiatives, weather-related decision-making
continues to account for a significant proportion of
fatal aircraft accidents in the United States and
elsewhere (Batt & O’Hare, 2005; National
Transportation Safety Board, 2003). This suggests
that either the underlying basis of poor weather-
related decision-making has yet to be understood or
that there are a number of bases that have yet to be
examined in concert.
It is generally agreed that there are two explanations
for poor weather-related decision-making. The first,
and most evident explanation in the literature, relates
to the notion that pilots ignore the features associated
with a deterioration in the weather conditions until
the situation becomes impossible to redress. This has
been termed a ‘plan-continuation error’, but is
colloquially referred to as ‘press-on-it-is’
(Wiegmann, Goh, & O’’Hare, 2002).
A plan-continuation error has been variously explained
as a product of: an underlying predisposition towards
risky activities (Cohen, 1993; Hunter, 2006); an over-
estimation of one’s personal capacity to respond to
threats to the safety of the aircraft (Wiggins, Connan,
& Morris, 1996); sunk cost, in which time already
invested predisposes an interpretation of the features of
the environment more positively than might normally
be the case (Wiegmann et al., 2002); and prospect
theory, in which the perception of a potential loss is
associated with a willingness to engage in activities
that might be regarded as ‘risk-seeking’ (O’Hare &
Smitheran, 1995).
The second explanation for poor weather-related
decision-making relates to the suggestion that pilots
either misinterpret, fail to perceive, or fail to integrate
information, rather than ignore the features associated
with deteriorating weather conditions (Hunter,
Martinussen, & Wiggins, 2003; Wiggins & O’Hare,
2003). This explanation is based on the assumption
that weather-related decision-making occurs under
uncertainty, and that the features associated with the
timely detection of deteriorating weather are subtle.
As  a  result  of  this  subtlety,  the  features  can  be
difficult to identify and integrate, particularly when a
pilot may be focusing his/her attention towards the
operation of the aircraft.
Empirical evidence is available to support both
explanations, suggesting that the underlying basis of
poor weather-related decision-making is more
complex than might be explained by either
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operational experience or the principle that pilots
ignore features in the environment. The primary aim
of  the  present  study  was  to  begin  to  develop  an
understanding of the complexities associated with
poor weather-related decision-making by identifying
the range of preconditions and local factors that are
associated with an unintended visual flight into
instrument meteorological conditions.
While there have been a number of epidemiological
studies of cases of inappropriate weather-related
decision-making, the aim has generally been to
identify a single factor that might explain the
behavior of pilots. These factors have included the
experience of the pilot, the nature and purpose of the
flight,  whether  the  aircraft  was  being  flown  by  an
owner-pilot, or the occupation of the pilot (Knecht,
Harris, & Shappell, 2005). Few studies have
examined the relationship between the preconditions
and  the  local  factors  that  may  have  occurred  at  the
time of the incident.
In examining preconditions and local factors
associated with weather-related decision-making
errors, the ideal approach would likely involve the
utilization of aircraft accident and incident reports
that have been subjected to various tests as part of a
comprehensive investigative process. However, many
cases of unintended visual flight into instrument
meteorological conditions remain unreported. Those
cases that have been investigated, generally do not
include detail sufficient to identify the range of
preconditions and local factors that may have
prevailed at the time (Australian Transport Safety
Bureau, 2004).
In the absence of suitable accident or incident reports,
the alternative is to seek information directly from
pilots who have been involved in various weather-
related decision-making events. This raises a number
of methodological issues, the most significant of
which is the reliance on the memory of the pilot. For
example, it may be the case that the specific details
associated with an event are unable to be recalled or
are reconstructed as a means of explaining a
particular occurrence (Robinson, Johnson, &
Robertson, 2000). These effects can be overcome, to
some extent, by restricting, for events recalled, the
timeframe within which the event occurred. It might
also be argued that unintended visual flight into
instrument meteorological conditions is sufficiently
memorable  insofar  as  there  is  a  threat  to  the  safety
and security of the aircraft and its passengers.
The acquisition of event-related data in the aviation
context can be problematic, given the relatively
disparate nature of the population under
investigation. This often necessitates the use of
questionnaires, despite the fact that the level of detail
acquired through questionnaires may be less than the
detail acquired through an interview technique.
However, Renshaw and Wiggins (in press) have
demonstrated that the judicious use of the
questionnaire technique can yield a relatively rich set
of data associated with critical in-flight events.
The questionnaire employed in the present study was
designed to acquire information pertaining to three
different categories of pilot: Those who had never
encountered deteriorating weather conditions in the
five years preceding the completion of the survey;
those who had experienced deteriorating weather
conditions during the five years preceding the
completion of the survey; and those pilots who had
experienced unintended visual flight into instrument
meteorological conditions. By comparing the
preconditions and local factors associated with those
events where pilots encountered deteriorating
weather conditions but did not fly into instrument
meteorological conditions to the preconditions and
local factors associated with unintended visual flight
into instrument conditions, it becomes possible to
establish the extent to which combinations of
preconditions and local factors are more or less likely




Participants were solicited from among visitors to a
web site (http://www.avhf.com) oriented toward
general aviation safety issues.  Approximately 400
participants had completed some or all of the scales
as of 1 December 2006.  The present analyses,
however, will be limited to the 224 pilots who
reported their principal residence as North America.
The mean age was 51.9 years (SD = 12.8), and total
flying hours varied substantially with a mean of 2039
hours (SD = 3889).
Procedure
A prominent notice was placed on the home page of
the  web  site  directing  visitors  to  another  page  on
which additional, detailed information regarding the
study was contained.  This second page provided
potential participants with all the information
necessary to make an informed consent decision to
take part in the study.  Upon indicating their consent
to participate, they were then automatically re-
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directed  to  a  web  page  on  which  they  created  a
unique personal identifier (“call sign”) and answered
the following two screening questions:
Q1.   During  the  last  5  years,  how  many  times
have you been on a flight (as pilot-in-command)
in which weather conditions prior to or during
the flight were a significant factor, perhaps even
a threat to the safety of the flight?
Q2.   During  the  last  5  years,  how  many  times
have you (as pilot-in-command) entered IMC
when you were not on an instrument flight plan
and/or did not have an instrument rating? That
is, you flew into cloud or into an area where the
visibility was clearly below the 3-mile [5-km]
minimum without ATC clearance.
Pilots who responded to the first question with
anything other than zero and responded with zero to
the second question, were designated as Near-
weather.  They were then automatically re-directed to
a web page containing questions regarding a recent
event.   Pilots  who  gave  a  non-zero  response  to  the
second question were designated as In-weather, and
re-directed to a web page containing questions
regarding their best-remembered event.  The
questions for Near-Weather and In-Weather were
virtually identical.  However, whereas the questions
for Near-Weather asked about their flight in which
weather was a significant factor, the questions for In-
Weather asked about the flight in which they entered
IMC without clearance.
Pilots  who  responded  zero  to  both  of  the  screening
questions were designated as No-Weather, and were
re-directed to the web page that collected
demographic information.  Upon completing the
questions regarding their weather experiences, the
pilots in Near-Weather and In-Weather were also
directed to the same demographic information web
page.  Following completion of the demographic
information page, all pilots completed a risk
perception scale and, optionally, an aviation
judgment scale.  Neither of those later scales will be
addressed in the current paper.
Measures
Pilots in both the Near-Weather and In-Weather
responded to 53 questions dealing with their
respective events.  These questions were divided into
categories and given in the following order:
1.  General:   When  did  the  event  occur,  what
happened (e.g., injuries), how long did it last.
2. Circumstances:  Where did you get your
weather brief, what did it say, what weather did
you run into, had you seen this before.
3. Aircraft:  Configuration, presence and use of
autopilot and GPS.
4. Event details:  Was the weather changing,
why did  you enter  the  weather  (or  fly  near  the
weather), did you have trouble maintaining
control, how did you feel during the event,
describe the event in own words.
In addition to the 53 questions regarding the event,
all pilots completed the background questions.  These
questions addressed total and recent aviation
experience, aeronautical ratings, recent training
events, personal minimums for local and cross-
country flights, and hazardous events that had
occurred during the previous 24 months.
Results
The sample was divided into three groups based on
their previous experience with bad weather. The first
group included those pilots who had never in the past
five years experienced bad weather. This group (No-
weather) included 54 pilots. The second group (Near-
Weather) included those who had experienced, (one
or more times) weather conditions during a flight that
were a significant factor or possibly a threat to safety
(n = 86). The last group (In-Weather) included those
who had, one or more times, entered IMC conditions
when not on an instrument flight plan (n = 84).
The pilots who had experience with bad weather
were asked about the main reason for entering bad
weather, and if they entered the situation deliberately
or inadvertently. More participants in the Near-
Weather group (54%) than In-Weather group (33%)
reported to have entered the situation deliberately
(Chi2 = 7.1, df = 1, p >.01). The most frequent reason
for doing so was “decided I could handle it” reported
by 29% of the Near-Weather group, followed by
didn’t realize the severity” reported by 20% as the
main reason. For the In-Weather group, the two most
frequent reasons were “did not realize the severity”
and “did not see the area of adverse weather”, both
reported by 18%.
The three groups were compared in terms of
demographical variables and experience variables.
There were no significant differences in age between
the three groups. Flying experience in terms of total
hours and recent hours (last 90 days) were compared
between the groups (Table 1), and there were no
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significant differences between the groups. The pilots
in the study had different types of certificates and
they were grouped into two categories, private
(student, recreational, sport, private) versus
commercial (ATP and commercial). The percentage
with a private pilot license was 64% for the No-
Weather-group, 57% for the Near-Weather and 61%
for the In-Weather-group. The difference between
groups in terms of certificate held was non-
significant (Chi2 = .89, df = 2, p >.05). The
percentage with an instrument rating was 50% for the
No-Weather group, 69% for the Near-Weather group,
and 60% for the In-Weather group. The differences
were not significant (Chi2 = 5.1, df = 2, p >.05).
The  pilots  were  also  asked  about  the  personal
minimum conditions for flying under Visual Flight
Regulations. The results are presented in Table 1.
The differences between groups were only significant
for minimum visibility on a local flight, where the
No-Weather group had higher standards than the In-
Weather group.
The pilots were also asked about previous hazardous
aviation events over the last 24 months (Table 1).
There were no significant differences between the
three groups.
Another purpose of the study was to examine
possible differences between the two groups of pilots
with experience with adverse weather both in terms
of event characteristics, aspects of the flight as well
as the weather conditions. We compared the groups
in terms of the purpose of the flight (business vs
pleasure), type of flight (cross country vs local), and
whether or not they had passengers on board. The
results are presented in Table 2.
The pilots reported where they had obtained weather
information before the flight, and they were also asked
to rate their understanding of the weather briefings.
The group who had experienced IMC conditions (In
Weather) reported to have a poorer understanding of
the weather briefings compared to the Near-Weather
group (Table 3).  There were no differences between
groups in terms of where they had collected
information before the flight. The preflight weather
forecast were generally better for the In-Weathers,
whereas there were no differences in terms of how the
weather turned out compared to the forecast (Table 2).
The pilots were also asked to rate how well they
remembered the event, their anxiety level, and the
perceived danger involved. The differences between
groups were non-significant. The results are
presented in Table 3.
Discussion
There are two general purposes served by this study.
The first, and perhaps foremost, is simply descriptive.
The data provide a reasonably reliable and
quantitative picture of the conditions and events
preceding a weather encounter.  The second purpose
is comparative.  The data provide an opportunity to
examine differences among the three groups, which
may help us to understand why one group
experiences a potentially very hazardous event, while
the other does not.
Some of the descriptive results reveal interesting
elements; for example, the high proportion of
autopilots on-board and/or in-use.  It is interesting to
speculate how the presence and use of these devices
may have affected the outcome of the weather
encounters.  Given the relatively high presence of
these devices in aircraft that experienced adverse
weather encounters, it might be profitable to design
interventions that would encourage better use of these
capabilities.  This example illustrates the general
utility of descriptive data.  They provide a basis for
informed decisions about the development of safety
interventions and plans.  Without those data,
developers are forced to make assumptions about
aircraft and pilot capabilities that may be false.
These false assumptions may lead to interventions
that are irrelevant or that fail to take advantage of
pre-existing capabilities. Consider, for example, the
difference between teaching pilots to maintain
control of the aircraft while making a level, 180-
degree turn to exit weather, as compared to teaching
pilots to turn on the autopilot when nearing weather,
and then to turn the heading control on the autopilot
to a reciprocal heading in the event of entry into
instrument conditions.
With respect to the second purpose of the study,
comparisons among the three groups, at this point it
seems clear that the most striking finding is that there
really are few differences among the three groups.
Based on the preliminary analyses conducted so far,
pilots who fly near weather, pilots who fly into
weather, and pilots who never go near weather are all
quite similar in most respects.  However, there are
some intriguing differences (personal minimums for
local visibility, understanding of weather briefs) that
invite further investigation.
Perhaps the major lesson from the comparative analyses
is that they demonstrate the difficulty, a priori, of
identifying pilots who will have close-calls with
weather, based solely on demographic variables.  This
may have implications for interventions or targeting of
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training.  It may also have implications for the sort of
variables we should be investigating.  Clearly we must
look beyond the surface characteristics and experiences
if we are to develop a better understanding of causality
in weather encounters, and by extension, weather-
related accidents.
Some of the data (risk perception and pilot judgment)
collected in this study, but not reported here due to
space limitations, may improve understanding by
looking beyond the surface demographic differences.
Future analyses will include those data and will also
examine  those  pilots  in  the  In  Weather  group,  to
compare those pilots who flew deliberately into IMC
with those pilots who entered IMC inadvertently.  As
additional data become available from pilots in
Norway, Australia, and New Zealand similar
analyses will be conducted using those pilots both
within and between countries.
The present analyses have been preliminary, and
based on only a portion of the total sample expected
to be collected in this study.  As more data become
available, some of the trends noticed in the present
analyses may become significant; such as the No-
weather group being slightly less experienced and
more cautious. Even so, it seems unlikely that
substantial differences will be found among the three
groups in the demographic and predecessor event
data.  Rather, much more research will be necessary
to understand why very similar pilots dealt with very
similar situations in quite dissimilar ways.
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Flying experience (hours) M SD M SD M SD F
Total experience 1619 4112 2354 3978 1999 3660 0.58




2.93 1.40 2.68 1.48 2.40 1.36 2.29
Ceiling: Cross-
country flight
4.08 1.48 3.81 1.53 3.57 1.49 1.83
Visibility: VFR local
flight
4.19 1.30 3.83 1.36 3.51 1.18 4.65*
Visibility: Cross-
country flight
4.92 1.53 4.57 1.43 4.54 1.34 1.42
Hazardous aviation events
(last 24 months) b
1.02 1.55 1.26 1.31 1.51 1.97 1.51
Note. aMinimum ceiling was scored in ft from 1 = 1000ft to 6 = 5000ft and more. Visibility was scored from 1 = 1
mile to 7 = 11 miles or more. bThe items in the scale were scored on a four-point scale (0 = none to 4 = four or
more). *p <.05.






Purpose of flight- pleasure 57% 52% .23
Local flight 10% 23% 5.37*







Note. *p <.05. **p < .01. **p < .001.




 (n = 82)
M SD M SD t
 Understanding of weather briefingsa  4.70 .54 4.50 .67 2.18*
 Memory of the eventb  4.10 .78 3.89 1.12 1.37
 Anxienty during the eventc  2.90 .88 2.86 .92 .43
 Perceived level of dangerd  1.94 .87 2.09 1.02 -.99
Note. aScale used was from 1 = very poor to 5 = very good. bScale used was from 1 = very hazy to 5 = very clear.
cScale from 1= very relaxed to 5 = extremely tense and anxious. dScale from 1= never in any real danger to 5 =
extreme danger. *p <.05 (two-tailed).
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